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Chapter XVII
Of Reason
1. Various significations of the word "reason". The word reason in
the English language has different significations: sometimes it is
taken for true and clear principles: sometimes for clear and fair
deductions from those principles: and sometimes for the cause, and
particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it
here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as
it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed
to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much
surpasses them.
2. Wherein reasoning consists. If general knowledge, as has been
shown, consists in a perception of the agreement or disagreement of
our own ideas, and the knowledge of the existence of all things
without us (except only of a God, whose existence every man may
certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own existence),
be had only by our senses, what room is there for the exercise of
any other faculty, but outward sense and inward perception? What
need it there of reason? Very much: both for the enlargement of our
knowledge, and regulating our assent. For it hath to do both in
knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other
intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz. sagacity
and illation. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so orders
the intermediate ideas as to discover what connexion there is in
each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and
thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which
is that which we call illation or inference, and consists in nothing
but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas, in
each step of the deduction; whereby the mind comes to see, either
the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in
demonstration, in which it arrives at knowledge; or their probable
connexion, on which it gives or withholds its assent, as in opinion.
Sense and intuition reach but a very little way. The greatest part
of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas: and
in those cases where we are fain to substitute assent instead of
knowledge, and take propositions for true, without being certain
they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the
grounds of their probability. In both these cases, the faculty which
finds out the means, and rightly applies them, to discover certainty
in the one, and probability in the other, is that which we call
reason. For, as reason perceives the necessary and indubitable
connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in each step of
any demonstration that produces knowledge; so it likewise perceives
the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in
every step of a discourse, to which it will think assent due. This
is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason. For
where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion, where it
does not discern whether there be any such connexion or no; there
men's opinions are not the product of judgment, or the consequence
of reason, but the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at
all adventures, without choice and without direction.
3. Reason in its four degrees. So that we may in reason consider
these degrees: four the first and highest is the discovering and
finding out of truths; the second, the regular and methodical
disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make
their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived; the third
is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth, a making a right
conclusion. These several degrees may be observed in any
mathematical demonstration; it being one thing to perceive the
connexion of each part, as the demonstration is made by another;
another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts;
a third, to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self;
and something different from all these, to have first found out
these intermediate ideas or proofs by which it is made.
4. Whether syllogism is the great instrument of reason: first
cause to doubt this. There is one thing more which I shall desire to
be considered concerning reason; and that is, whether syllogism, as is
generally thought, be the proper instrument of it, and the
usefullest way of exercising this faculty. The causes I have to
doubt are these:-
First, Because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of the
forementioned parts of it; and that is, to show the connexion of the
proofs in any one instance, and no more; but in this it is of no great
use, since the mind can perceive such connexion, where it really is,
as easily, nay, perhaps better, without it.
Men can reason well who cannot make a syllogism. If we will
observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that we reason
best and clearest, when we only observe the connexion of the proof,
without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. And
therefore we may take notice, that there are many men that reason
exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism.
He that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men
reason there perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a
syllogism, nor can reduce any one argument to those forms: and I
believe scarce any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself.
Indeed syllogism is made use of, on occasion, to discover a fallacy
hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cunningly wrapt up in a smooth
period; and, stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good
language, show it in its naked deformity. But the weakness or
fallacy of such a loose discourse it shows, by the artificial form
it is put into, only to those who have thoroughly studied mode and
figure, and have so examined the many ways that three propositions may
be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude
right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do so. All
who have so far considered syllogism, as to see the reason why in
three propositions laid together in one form, the conclusion will be
certainly right, but in another not certainly so, I grant are
certain of the conclusion they draw from the premises in the allowed
modes and figures. But they who have not so far looked into those
forms, are not sure by virtue of syllogism, that the conclusion
certainly follows from the premises; they only take it to be so by
an implicit faith in their teachers and a confidence in those forms of
argumentation; but this is still but believing, not being certain.
Now, if, of all mankind those who can make syllogisms are extremely
few in comparison of those who cannot; and if, of those few who have
been taught logic, there is but a very small number who do any more
than believe that syllogisms, in the allowed modes and figures do
conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do so: if
syllogisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason
and means of knowledge, it will follow, that, before Aristotle,
there was not one man that did or could know anything by reason; and
that, since the invention of syllogisms, there is not one of ten
thousand that doth.
Aristotle. But God has not been so sparing to men to make them
barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them
rational, i.e. those few of them that he could get so to examine the
grounds of syllogisms, as to see that, in above three score ways
that three propositions may be laid together, there are but about
fourteen wherein one may be sure that the conclusion is right; and
upon what grounds it is, that, in these few, the conclusion is
certain, and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to
mankind than so. He has given them a mind that can reason, without
being instructed in methods of syllogizing: the understanding is not
taught to reason by these rules; it has a native faculty to perceive
the coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right,
without any such perplexing repetitions. I say not this any way to
lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest men amongst
the ancients; whose large views, acuteness, and penetration of thought
and strength of judgment, few have equalled; and who, in this very
invention of forms of argumentation, wherein the conclusion may be
shown to be rightly inferred, did great service against those who were
not ashamed to deny anything. And I readily own, that all right
reasoning may be reduced to his forms of syllogism. But yet I think,
without any diminution to him, I may truly say, that they are not
the only nor the best way of reasoning, for the leading of those
into truth who are willing to find it, and desire to make the best use
they may of their reason, for the attainment of knowledge. And he
himself, it is plain, found out some forms to be conclusive, and
others not, not by the forms themselves, but by the original way of
knowledge, i.e. by the visible agreement of ideas. Tell a country
gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weather lowering, and
like to rain, and she will easily understand it is not safe for her to
go abroad thin clad in such a day, after a fever: she clearly sees the
probable connexion of all these, viz. south-west wind, and clouds,
rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, without
tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of
several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from
one part to another quicker and clearer without them: and the
probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their
native state would be quite lost, if this argument were managed
learnedly, and proposed in mode and figure. For it very often
confounds the connexion; and, I think, every one will perceive in
mathematical demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes
shortest and clearest without syllogism.
Inference is looked on as the great act of the rational faculty, and
so it is when it is rightly made: but the mind, either very desirous
to enlarge its knowledge, or very apt to favour the sentiments it
has once imbibed, is very forward to make inferences; and therefore
often makes too much haste, before it perceives the connexion of the
ideas that must hold the extremes together.
Syllogism does not discover ideas, or their connexions. To infer, is
nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to draw in
another as true, i.e. to see or suppose such a connexion of the two
ideas of the inferred proposition. V.g. Let this be the proposition
laid down, "Men shall be punished in another world," and from thence
be inferred this other, "Then men can determine themselves." The
question now is, to know whether the mind has made this inference
right or no: if it has made it by finding out the intermediate
ideas, and taking a view of the connexion of them, placed in a due
order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right inference: if
it has done it without such a view, it has not so much made an
inference that will hold, or an inference of right reason, as shown
a willingness to have it be, or be taken for such. But in neither case
is it syllogism that discovered those ideas, or showed the connexion
of them; for they must be both found out, and the connexion everywhere
perceived, before they can rationally be made use of in syllogism:
unless it can be said, that any idea, without considering what
connexion it hath with the two other, whose agreement should be
shown by it, will do well enough in a syllogism, and may be taken at a
venture for the medius terminus, to prove any conclusion. But this
nobody will say; because it is by virtue of the perceived agreement of
the intermediate idea with the extremes, that the extremes are
concluded to agree; and therefore each intermediate idea must be
such as in the whole chain hath a visible connexion with those two
it has been placed between, or else thereby the conclusion cannot be
inferred or drawn in: for wherever any link of the chain is loose
and without connexion, there the whole strength of it is lost, and
it hath no force to infer or draw in anything. In the instance above
mentioned, what is it shows the force of the inference, and
consequently the reasonableness of it, but a view of the connexion
of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the conclusion, or
proposition inferred? V.g. "Men shall be punished"; "God the
punisher"; "Just punishment"; "The punished guilty"; "Could have
done otherwise"; "Freedom"; "Self-determination"; by which chain of
ideas thus visibly linked together in train, i.e. each intermediate
idea agreeing on each side with those two it is immediately placed
between, the ideas of men and self-determination appear to be
connected, i.e. this proposition "men can determine themselves" is
drawn in or inferred from this, "that they shall be punished in the
other world." For here the mind, seeing the connexion there is between
the idea of men's punishment in the other world and the idea of God
punishing; between God punishing and the justice of the punishment;
between justice of punishment and guilt; between guilt and a power
to do otherwise; between a power to do otherwise and freedom; and
between freedom and self-determination, sees the connexion between men
and self-determination.
The connexion must be discovered before it can be put into
syllogisms. Now I ask, whether the connexion of the extremes be not
more clearly seen in this simple and natural disposition, than in
the perplexed repetitions, and jumble of five or six syllogisms. I
must beg pardon for calling it jumble, till somebody shall put these
ideas into so many syllogisms, and then say that they are less
jumbled, and their connexion more visible, when they are transposed
and repeated, and spun out to a greater length in artificial forms,
than in that short and natural plain order they are laid down in here,
wherein everyone may see it, and wherein they must be seen before they
can be put into a train of syllogisms. For the natural order of the
connecting ideas must direct the order of the syllogisms, and a man
must see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those that it
connects, before he can with reason make use of it in a syllogism. And
when all those syllogisms are made, neither those that are nor those
that are not logicians will see the force of the argumentation,
i.e., the connexion of the extremes, one jot the better. [For those
that are not men of art, not knowing the true forms of syllogism,
nor the reasons of them, cannot know whether they are made in right
and conclusive modes and figures or no, and so are not at all helped
by the forms they are put into; though by them the natural order,
wherein the mind could judge of their respective connexion, being
disturbed, renders the illation much more uncertain than without
them.] And as for the logicians themselves, they see the connexion
of each intermediate idea with those it stands between, (on which
the force of the inference depends,) as well before as after the
syllogism is made, or else they do not see it at all. For a
syllogism neither shows nor strengthens the connexion of any two ideas
immediately put together, but only by the connexion seen in them shows
what connexion the extremes have one with another. But what
connexion the intermediate has with either of the extremes in the
syllogism, that no syllogism does or can show. That the mind only doth
or can perceive as they stand there in that juxta-position by its
own view, to which the syllogistical form it happens to be in gives no
help or light at all: it only shows that if the intermediate idea
agrees with those it is on both sides immediately applied to; then
those two remote ones, or, as they are called, extremes, do
certainly agree; and therefore the immediate connexion of each idea to
that which it is applied to on each side, on which the force of the
reasoning depends, is as well seen before as after the syllogism is
made, or else he that makes the syllogism could never see it at all.
This, as has been already observed, is seen only by the eye, or the
perceptive faculty, of the mind, taking a view of them laid
together, in a juxta-position; which view of any two it has equally,
whenever they are laid together in any proposition, whether that
proposition be placed as a major or a minor, in a syllogism or no.
Use of syllogism. Of what use, then are syllogisms? I answer,
their chief and main use is in the Schools, where men are allowed
without shame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly agree;
or out of the Schools, to those who from thence have learned without
shame to deny the connexion of ideas, which even to themselves is
visible. But to an ingenuous searcher after truth, who has no other
aim but to find it, there is no need of any such form to force the
allowing of the inference: the truth and reasonableness of it is
better seen in ranging of the ideas in a simple and plain order: and
hence it is that men, in their own inquiries after truth, never use
syllogisms to convince themselves or in teaching others to instruct
willing learners. Because, before they can put them into a
syllogism, they must see the connexion that is between the
intermediate idea and the two other ideas it is set between and
applied to, to show their agreement; and when they see that, they
see whether the inference be good or no; and so syllogism comes too
late to settle it. For to make use again of the former instance, I ask
whether the mind, considering the idea of justice, placed as an
intermediate idea between the punishment of men and the guilt of the
punished, (and till it does so consider it, the mind cannot make use
of it as a medius terminus,) does not as plainly see the force and
strength of the inference as when it is formed into a syllogism. To
show it in a very plain and easy example; let animal be the
intermediate idea or medius terminus that the mind makes use of to
show the connexion of homo and vivens; I ask whether the mind does not
more readily and plainly see that connexion in the simple and proper
position of the connecting idea in the middle thus:
Homo- Animal- Vivens,
than in this perplexed one,
Animal- Vivens- Homo- Animal:
which is the position these ideas have in a syllogism, to show the
connexion between homo and vivens by the intervention of animal.
Not the only way to detect fallacies. Indeed syllogism is thought to
be of necessary use, even to the lovers of truth, to show them the
fallacies that are often concealed in florid, witty, or involved
discourses. But that this is a mistake will appear, if we consider,
that the reason why sometimes men who sincerely aim at truth are
imposed upon by such loose, and, as they are called, rhetorical
discourses, is, that their fancies being struck with some lively
metaphorical representations, they neglect to observe, or do not
easily perceive, what are the true ideas upon which the inference
depends. Now, to show such men the weakness of such an
argumentation, there needs no more but to strip if of the
superfluous ideas, which, blended and confounded with those on which
the inference depends, seem to show a connexion where there is none;
or at least to hinder the discovery of the want of it; and then to lay
the naked ideas on which the force of the argumentation depends in
their due order; in which position the mind, taking a view of them,
sees what connexion they have, and so is able to judge of the
inference without any need of a syllogism at all.
I grant that mode and figure is commonly made use of in such
cases, as if the detection of the incoherence of such loose discourses
were wholly owing to the syllogistical form; and so I myself
formerly thought, till, upon a stricter examination, I now find,
that laying the intermediate ideas naked in their due order, shows the
incoherence of the argumentation better than syllogism; not only as
subjecting each link of the chain to the immediate view of the mind in
its proper place, whereby its connexion is best observed; but also
because syllogism shows the incoherence only to those (who are not one
of ten thousand) who perfectly understand mode and figure, and the
reason upon which those forms are established; whereas a due and
orderly placing of the ideas upon which the inference is made, makes
every one, whether logician or not logician, who understands the
terms, and hath the faculty to perceive the agreement or
disagreement of such ideas, (without which, in or out of syllogism, he
cannot perceive the strength or weakness, coherence or incoherence
of the discourse) see the want of connexion in the argumentation,
and the absurdity of the inference.
And thus I have known a man unskilful in syllogism, who at first
hearing could perceive the weakness and inconclusiveness of a long
artificial and plausible discourse, wherewith others better skilled in
syllogism have been misled: and I believe there are few of my
readers who do not know such. And indeed, if it were not so, the
debates of most princes' councils, and the business of assemblies,
would be in danger to be mismanaged, since those who are relied
upon, and have usually a great stroke in them, are not always such who
have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the forms of
syllogism, or expert in mode and figure. And if syllogism were the
only, or so much as the surest way to detect the fallacies of
artificial discourses; I do not think that all mankind, even princes
in matters that concern their crowns and dignities, are so much in
love with falsehood and mistake, that they would everywhere have
neglected to bring syllogism into the debates of moment; or thought it
ridiculous so much as to offer them in affairs of consequence; a plain
evidence to me, that men of parts and penetration, who were not idly
to dispute at their ease, but were to act according to the result of
their debates, and often pay for their mistakes with their heads or
fortunes, found those scholastic forms were of little use to
discover truth or fallacy, whilst both the one and the other might
be shown, and better shown without them, to those who would not refuse
to see what was visibly shown them.
Another cause to doubt whether syllogism be the only proper
instrument of reason, in the discovery of truth. Secondly, Another
reason that makes me doubt whether syllogism be the only proper
instrument of reason, in the discovery of truth, is, that of
whatever use mode and figure is pretended to be in the laying open
of fallacy, (which has been above considered,) those scholastic
forms of discourse are not less liable to fallacies than the plainer
ways of argumentation; and for this I appeal to common observation,
which has always found these artificial methods of reasoning more
adapted to catch and entangle the mind, than to instruct and inform
the understanding. And hence it is that men, even when they are
baffled and silenced in this scholastic way, are seldom or never
convinced, and so brought over to the conquering side: they perhaps
acknowledge their adversary to be the more skilful disputant, but rest
nevertheless persuaded of the truth on their side, and go away,
worsted as they are, with the same opinion they brought with them:
which they could not do if this way of argumentation carried light and
conviction with it, and made men see where the truth lay; and
therefore syllogism has been thought more proper for the attaining
victory in dispute, than for the discovery or confirmation of truth in
fair inquiries. And if it be certain, that fallacies can be couched in
syllogism, as it cannot be denied; it must be something else, and
not syllogism, that must discover them.
I have had experience how ready some men are, when all the use which
they have been wont to ascribe to anything is not allowed, to cry out,
that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such unjust and
groundless imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any
helps to the understanding in the attainment of knowledge. And if
men skilled in and used to syllogisms, find them assisting to their
reason in the discovery of truth, I think they ought to make use of
them. All that I aim at, is, that they should not ascribe more to
these forms than belongs to them, and think that men have no use, or
not so full an use, of their reasoning faculties without them. Some
eyes want spectacles to see things clearly and distinctly; but let not
those that use them therefore say nobody can see clearly without them:
those who do so will be thought, in favour of art (which, perhaps,
they are beholden to,) a little too much to depress and discredit
nature. Reason, by its own penetration, where it is strong and
exercised, usually sees quicker and clearer without syllogism. If
use of those spectacles has so dimmed its sight, that it cannot
without them see consequences or inconsequences in argumentation, I am
not so unreasonable as to be against the using them. Every one knows
what best fits his own sight; but let him not thence conclude all in
the dark, who use not just the same helps that he finds a need of.
5. Syllogism helps little in demonstration, less in probability. But
however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is of far
less, or no use at all in probabilities. For the assent there being to
be determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing of all the
proofs, with all circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to
assist the mind in that as syllogism; which running away with one
assumed probability, or one topical argument, pursues that till it has
led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration; and,
forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there; entangled
perhaps, and, as it were, manacled, in the chain of syllogisms,
without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps,
requisite to show on which side, all things considered, is the greater
probability.
6. Serves not to increase our knowledge, but to fence with the
knowledge we suppose we have. But let it help us (as perhaps may be
said) in convincing men of their errors and mistakes: (and yet I would
fain see the man that was forced out of his opinion by dint of
syllogism,) yet still it fails our reason in that part, which, if
not its highest perfection, is yet certainly its hardest task, and
that which we most need its help in; and that is the finding out of
proofs, and making new discoveries. The rules of syllogism serve not
to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show the
connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new
proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have
already. The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid
is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing to any rules
of common logic. A man knows first, and then he is able to prove
syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then a
man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding
out those ideas that show the connexion of distant ones, that our
stock of knowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are
advanced. Syllogism, at best, is but the art of fencing with the
little knowledge we have, without making any addition to it. And if
a man should employ his reason all this way, he will not do much
otherwise than he who, having got some iron out of the bowels of the
earth, should have it beaten up all into swords, and put it into his
servants' hands to fence with and bang one another. Had the King of
Spain employed the hands of his people, and his Spanish iron so, he
had brought to light but little of that treasure that lay so long
hid in the dark entrails of America. And I am apt to think, that he
who shall employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of
syllogisms, will discover very little of that mass of knowledge
which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature; and
which, I am apt to think, native rustic reason (as it formerly has
done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common stock of
mankind, rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strict rules
of mod, and figure.
7. Other helps to reason than syllogism should be sought. I doubt
not, nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to assist our reason
in this most useful part; and this the judicious Hooker encourages
me to say, who in his Eccl. Pol. 1. i. SS 6, speaks thus: "If there
might be added the right helps of true art and learning, (which helps,
I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying the name of
a learned age, doth neither much know nor generally regard,) there
would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity of judgment
between men therewith inured, and that which men now are, as between
men that are now, and innocents." I do not pretend to have found or
discovered here any of those "right helps of art," this great man of
deep thought mentions: but that is plain, that syllogism, and the
logic now in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of
those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps
something out of the way, I am sure, as to me, wholly new and
unborrowed, I shall have given occasion to others to cast about for
new discoveries, and to seek in their own thoughts for those right
helps of art, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who
servilely confine themselves to the rules and dictates of others.
For beaten tracks lead this sort of cattle, (as an observing Roman
calls them,) whose thoughts reach only to imitation, Non quo eundum
est, sed quo itur. But I can be bold to say, that this age is
adorned with some men of that strength of judgment and largeness of
comprehension, that, if they would employ their thoughts on this
subject, could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement of
knowledge.
8. We can reason about particulars; and the immediate object of
all our reasonings is nothing but particular ideas. Having here had
occasion to speak of syllogism in general, and the use of it in
reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit, before I
leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest mistake in the
rules of syllogism: viz. that no syllogistical reasoning can be
right and conclusive, but what has at least one general proposition in
it. As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars:
whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object
of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars.
Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing
in his own mind; which are truly, every one of them, particular
existences: and our knowledge and reason about other things is only as
they correspond with those particular ideas. So that the perception of
the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas is the whole and
utmost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and
consists only in this, that the particular ideas about which it is are
such as more than one particular thing can correspond with and be
represented by. But the perception of the agreement or disagreement of
any two ideas, and consequently our knowledge, is equally clear and
certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those ideas, be
capable of representing more real beings than one, or no. One thing
more I crave leave to offer about syllogism, before I leave it, viz.
May one not upon just ground inquire whether the form syllogism now
has, is that which in reason it ought to have? For the medius terminus
being to join the extremes, i.e. the intermediate ideas, by its
intervention, to show the agreement or disagreement of the two in
question, would not the position of the medius terminus be more
natural, and show the agreement or disagreement of the extremes
clearer and better, if it were placed in the middle between them?
Which might be easily done by transposing the propositions, and making
the medius terminus the predicate of the first, and the subject of the
second. As thus:
Omnis homo est animal.
Omne animal est vivens.
Ergo, omnis homo est vivens.
Omne corpus est extensum et solidum.
Nullum extensum et solidum est pura extensio.
Ergo, corpus non est pura extensio.
I need not trouble my reader with instances in syllogisms whose
conclusions are particular. The same reason hold for the same form
in them, as well as in the general.
9. Our reason often fails us. Reason, though it penetrates into
the depths of the sea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high as
the stars, and leads us through the vast spaces and large rooms of
this mighty fabric, yet it comes far short of the real extent of
even corporeal being. And there are many instances wherein it fails
us: as,
I. In cases when we have no ideas. It perfectly fails us where our
ideas fail. It neither does nor can extend itself further than they
do. And therefore, wherever we have no ideas, our reasoning stops, and
we are at an end of our reckoning: and if at any time we reason
about words which do not stand for any ideas, it is only about those
sounds, and nothing else.
10. II. Because our ideas are often obscure or imperfect. Our reason
is often puzzled and at a loss because of the obscurity, confusion, or
imperfection of the ideas it is employed about; and there we are
involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any
perfect idea of the least extension of matter, nor of infinity, we are
at a loss about the divisibility of matter; but having perfect, clear,
and distinct ideas of number, our reason meets with none of those
inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any
contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of
the operations of out minds, and of the beginning of motion, or
thought how the mind produces either of them in us, and much
imperfecter yet of the operation of God, run into great difficulties
about free created agents, which reason cannot well extricate itself
out of.
11. III. Because we perceive not intermediate ideas to show
conclusions. Our reason is often at a stand because it perceives not
those ideas, which could serve to show the certain or probable
agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some
men's faculties far outgo others. Till algebra, that great
instrument and instance of human sagacity, was discovered, men with
amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient
mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding
several of those proofs to be something more than human.
12. IV. Because we often proceed upon wrong principles. The mind, by
proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in absurdities
and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions, without
knowing how to free itself: and in that case it is in vain to
implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and
reject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far
from clearing the difficulties which the building upon false
foundations brings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles
him the more, and engages him deeper in perplexities.
13. V. Because we often employ doubtful terms. As obscure and
imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon the same ground, do
dubious words and uncertain signs, often, in discourses and
arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and
bring them to a nonplus. But these two latter are our fault, and not
the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless
obvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are
everywhere observable.
14. Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning.
Some of the ideas that are in the mind, are so there, that they can be
by themselves immediately compared one with another: and in these
the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as
that it has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is
less than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a
circle: and this, therefore, as has been said, I call intuitive
knowledge; which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation,
nor can have any; this being the highest of all human certainty. In
this consists the evidence of all those maxims which nobody has any
doubt about, but every man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but)
knows to be true, as soon as ever they are proposed to his
understanding. In the discovery of and assent to these truths, there
is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they
are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence. And such, if
I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that angels have now,
and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have, in a future
state, of thousands of things which now either wholly escape our
apprehensions, or which our short-sighted reason having got some faint
glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.
15. The next is got by reasoning. But though we have, here and
there, a little of this clear light, some sparks of bright
knowledge, yet the greatest part of our ideas are such, that we cannot
discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediate comparing
them. And in all these we have need of reasoning, and must, by
discourse and inference, make our discoveries. Now of these there
are two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again:-
Through reasonings that are demonstrative. First, Those whose
agreement or disagreement, though it cannot be seen by an immediate
putting them together, yet may be examined by the intervention of
other ideas which can be compared with them. In this case, when the
agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea, on both sides,
with those which we would compare, is plainly discerned: there it
amounts to demonstration whereby knowledge is produced, which,
though it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear
as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple
intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or
doubt: the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it
is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there
must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium,
or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we
compare it with the other: and where there be many mediums, there
the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or
disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of
the whole train, and retained in the memory, just as it is; and the
mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the
demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations
long and perplexed, and too hard for those who have not strength of
parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars
orderly in their heads. And even those who are able to master such
intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again,
and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at
certainty. But yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had
of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third,
and that with a fourth, &c., there the agreement of the first and
the fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain knowledge; which
may be called rational knowledge, as the other is intuitive.
16. To supply the narrowness of demonstrative and intuitive
knowledge we have nothing but judgment upon probable reasoning.
Secondly, There are other ideas, whose agreement or disagreement can
no otherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have
not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual or likely one:
and in these it is that the judgment is properly exercised; which is
the acquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing
them with such probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to
knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet
sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly
together, and the probability is so clear and strong, that assent as
necessarily follows it, as knowledge does demonstration. The great
excellency and use of the judgment is to observe right, and take a
true estimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then
casting them up all right together, choose that side which has the
overbalance.
17. Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement
or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together.
Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or
disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more
other ideas.
Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree,
by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or
disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be
frequent and usual.
18. Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas. Though the
deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences in
words, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually
employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is the
finding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas one with another,
by the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard, finds two
houses to be of the same length, to measure their equality by
juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such
ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we
observe it only by our ideas.
19. Four sorts of arguments. Before we quit this subject, it may
be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of arguments,
that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of
to prevail on their assent; or at least to awe them as to silence
their opposition.
I. Argumentum ad verecundiam. The first is, to allege the opinions
of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause
has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem
with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of
dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate
any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in
possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it
too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination
of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and
submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence, for a man to
set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of
antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned
doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with
such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is
ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against
them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam.
20. II. Argumentum ad ignorantiam. Secondly, Another way that men
ordinarily use to drive others and force them to submit to their
judgments, and receive their opinion in debate, is to require the
adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to assign a better.
And this I call argumentum ad ignorantiam.
21. III. Argumentum ad hominem. Thirdly, a third way is to press a
man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions.
This is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem.
22. IV. Argumentum adjudicium. The fourth alone advances us in
knowledge and judgment. The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from
any of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call
argumentum adjudicium. This alone, of all the four, brings true
instruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. For,
1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, because I, out
of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will
not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right
way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not
a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way
because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and
therefore not oppose another man's persuasion: I may be ignorant,
and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and another
may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the
reception of truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from proofs
and arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves,
and not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error.
23. Above, contrary, and according to reason. By what has been
before said of reason, we may be able to make some guess at the
distinction of things into those that are according to, above, and
contrary to reason. 1. According to reason are such propositions whose
truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have
from sensation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be
true or probable. 2. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or
probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles. 3.
Contrary to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with or
irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence
of one God is according to reason; the existence of more than one God,
contrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason.
Above reason also may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as
signifying above probability, or above certainty: and in that large
sense also, contrary to reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken.
24. Reason and faith not opposite, for faith must be regulated by
reason. There is another use of the word reason, wherein it is opposed
to faith: which, though it be in itself a very improper way of
speaking, yet common use has so authorized it, that it would be
folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not
be amiss to take notice that, however faith be opposed to reason,
faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which, if it be
regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon
good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without
having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own
fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience
due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he
has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does
not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on
truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the
luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his
proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable
for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the
light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover
truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this
satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he
should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs
his assent right, and places it as he should, who, in any case or
matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason directs
him. He that doth otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and
misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end, but to
search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability. But
since reason and faith are by some men opposed, we will so consider
them in the following chapter.
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