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Chapter XVI
Of the Degrees of Assent
1. Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability.
The grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter:
as they are the foundations on which our assent is built, so are
they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to
be regulated: only we are to take notice that, whatever grounds of
probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind
which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they
appear; at least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes.
I confess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to in the world,
their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that
at first prevailed with them: it being in many cases almost
impossible, and in most, very hard, even for those who have very
admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due
examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It
suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the
matter as far as they could; and that they have searched into all
the particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the
question; and, with the best of their skill, cast up the account
upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found on which side the
probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an inquiry as
they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories as a truth
they have discovered; and for the future they remain satisfied with
the testimony of their memories that this is the opinion that, by
the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of
their assent as they afford it.
2. These cannot always be actually in view; and then we must content
ourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a
degree of assent. This is all that the greatest part of men are
capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgments; unless a
man will exact of them, either to retain distinctly in their
memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth, and that too,
in the same order, and regular deduction of consequences in which they
have formerly placed or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a
large volume on one single question: or else they must require a
man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the
proofs: both which are impossible. It is unavoidable, therefore,
that the memory be relied on in the case, and that men be persuaded of
several opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their
thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall.
Without this, the greatest part of men must be either very sceptic; or
change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately
studied the question, offers them arguments, which, for want of
memory, they are not able presently to answer.
3. The ill consequence of this, if our former judgments were not
rightly made. I cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past
judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often
the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is
not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well
judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. May
we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men
that think they have formed right judgments of several matters; and
that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise?
that imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they
never questioned, never examined, their own opinions? Which is
indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all.
And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the greatest
stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their
tenets, who have least examined them. What we once know, we are
certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs
undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in
doubt. But, in matters of probability, it is not in every case we
can be sure that we have all the particulars before us, that any way
concern the question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet
unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh
all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there
that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the
proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to
conclude that he hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more
to be alleged for his better information? And yet we are forced to
determine ourselves on the one side or other. The conduct of our
lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear
delay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of
our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and
demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace
the one side or the other.
4. The right use of it, mutual charity and forbearance, in a
necessary diversity of opinions. Since, therefore, it is unavoidable
to the greatest part of men, if not all, to have several opinions,
without certain and indubitable proofs of their truth; and it
carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly
for men to quit and renounce their former tenets presently upon the
offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer, and show
the insufficiency of: it would, methinks, become all men to maintain
peace, and the common offices of humanity, and friendship, in the
diversity of opinions; since we cannot reasonably expect that any
one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion, and
embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an authority which the
understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may often
mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to
the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your
sentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give him
leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling what
is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which
side the advantage lies: and if he will not think our arguments of
weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we
often do ourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss if
others should prescribe to us what points we should study. And if he
be one who takes his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he
should renounce those tenets which time and custom have so settled
in his mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an
unquestionable certainty; or which he takes to be impressions he has
received from God himself, or from men sent by him? How can we expect,
I say, that opinions thus settled should be given up to the
arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary, especially if there
be any suspicion of interest or design, as there never fails to be,
where men find themselves ill treated? We should do well to
commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all
the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantly treat
others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not
renounce their own, and receive our opinions, or at least those we
would force upon them, when it is more than probable that we are no
less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man
that has incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds,
or of the falsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he has
examined to the bottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The
necessity of believing without knowledge, nay often upon very slight
grounds, in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in,
should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than
constrain others. At least, those who have not thoroughly examined
to the bottom all their own tenets, must confess they are unfit to
prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on
other men's belief, which they themselves have not searched into,
nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they should receive
or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are
thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern
themselves by, would have a juster pretence to require others to
follow them: but these are so few in number, and find so little reason
to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing insolent and
imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason to think,
that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less
imposing on others.
5. Probability is either of sensible matter of fact, capable of
human testimony, or of what is beyond the evidence of our senses.
But to return to the grounds of assent, and the several degrees of it,
we are to take notice, that the propositions we receive upon
inducements of probability are of two sorts: either concerning some
particular existence, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact,
which, falling under observation, is capable of human testimony; or
else concerning things, which, being beyond the discovery of our
senses, are not capable of any such testimony.
6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours, produces
assurance approaching to knowledge. Concerning the first of these,
viz. Particular matter of fact.
I. Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation
of ourselves and others in the like case, comes attested by the
concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily,
and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we
reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect
demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention
it, should affirm that it froze in England the last winter, or that
there were swallows seen there in the summer, I think a man could
almost as little doubt of it as that seven and four are eleven. The
first, therefore, and highest degree of probability, is, when the
general consent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known,
concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like
cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact
attested by fair witnesses: such are all the stated constitutions
and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and
effects in the ordinary course of nature. This we call an argument
from the nature of things themselves. For what our own and other men's
constant observation has found always to be after the same manner,
that we with reason conclude to be the effect of steady and regular
causes; though they come not within the reach of our knowledge.
Thus, That fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changes the
colour or consistency in wood or charcoal; that iron sunk in water,
and swam in quicksilver: these and the like propositions about
particular facts, being agreeable to our constant experience, as often
as we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of
(when mentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so, and
therefore not so much as controverted by anybody- we are put past
doubt that a relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any
prediction that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true.
These probabilities rise so near to certainty, that they govern our
thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the
most evident demonstration; and in what concerns us we make little
or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief,
thus grounded, rises to assurance.
7. II. Unquestionable testimony, and our own experience that a thing
is for the most part so, produce confidence. The next degree of
probability is, when I find by my own experience, and the agreement of
all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most part so, and
that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted
witnesses: v.g. history giving us such an account of men in all
ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to
observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage
to the public: if all historians that write of Tiberius, say that
Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our
assent has a sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which
we may call confidence.
8. III. Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent,
produce unavoidable assent. In things that happen indifferently, as
that a bird should fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a
man's right or left hand, &c., when any particular matter of fact is
vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there
our assent is also unavoidable. Thus: that there is such a city in
Italy as Rome: that about one thousand seven hundred years ago,
there lived in it a man, called Julius Caesar; that he was a
general, and that he won a battle against another, called Pompey.
This, though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor
against it, yet being related by historians of credit, and
contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and
can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of his
own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.
9. Experience and testimonies clashing infinitely vary the degrees
of probability. Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon
such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally
determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or
disbelieve, as a demonstration does, whether we will know, or be
ignorant. The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common
experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the
ordinary course of nature, or with one another; there it is, where
diligence, attention, and exactness are required, to form a right
judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and
probability of the thing: which rises and falls, according as those
two foundations of credibility, viz. common observation in like cases,
and particular testimonies in that particular instance, favour or
contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of contrary
observations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications,
tempers, designs, oversights, &c., of the reporters, that it is
impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees wherein
men give their assent. This only may be said in general, That as the
arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely
weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear,
upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree to preponderate
on either side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such
different entertainments, as we call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt,
wavering, distrust, disbelief, &c.
10. Traditional testimonies, the further removed the less their
proof becomes. This is what concerns assent in matters wherein
testimony is made use of: concerning which, I think, it may not be
amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of England; which
is, That though the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the
copy of a copy, ever so well attested, and by ever so credible
witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is so
generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the wisdom and caution
to be used in our inquiry after material truths, that I never yet
heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable
in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along
with it, viz. That any testimony, the further off it is from the
original truth, the less force and proof it has. The being and
existence of the thing itself, is what I call the original truth. A
credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof; but if
another equally credible do witness it from his report, the
testimony is weaker: and a third that attests the hearsay of an
hearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths,
each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the
tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and
evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be
taken notice of: because I find amongst some men the quite contrary
commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing
older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational man
contemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is
now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have
since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground
propositions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first
beginning, come, by an inverted rule of probability, to pass for
authentic truths; and those which found or deserved little credit from
the mouths of their first authors, are thought to grow venerable by
age, are urged as undeniable.
11. Yet history is of great use. I would not be thought here to
lessen the credit and use of history: it is all the light we have in
many cases, and we have in many cases, and we receive from it a
great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I
think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we
had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces
me to say, That no probability can rise higher than its first
original. What has no other evidence than the single testimony of
one only witness must stand or fall by his only testimony, whether
good, bad, or indifferent; and though cited afterwards by hundreds
of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength
thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest,
inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, or
capricios, men's minds are acted by, (impossible to be discovered,)
may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong. He that
has but ever so little examined the citations of writers, cannot doubt
how little credit the quotations deserve, where the originals are
wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can
be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed
upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future
ages by being often repeated. But the further still it is from the
original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the mouth
or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom he
received it.
12. In things which sense cannot discover, analogy is the great rule
of probability. [Secondly], The probabilities we have hitherto
mentioned are only such as concern matter of fact, and such things
as are capable of observation and testimony. There remains that
other sort, concerning which men entertain opinions with variety of
assent, though the things be such, that falling not under the reach of
our senses, they are not capable of testimony. Such are, 1. The
existence, nature and operations of finite immaterial beings without
us; as spirits, angels, devils, &c. Or the existence of material
beings which, either for their smallness in themselves or remoteness
from us, our senses cannot take notice of- as, whether there be any
plants, animals, and intelligent inhabitants in the planets, and other
mansions of the vast universe. 2. Concerning the manner of operation
in most parts of the works of nature: wherein, though we see the
sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we perceive not
the ways and manner how they are produced. We see animals are
generated, nourished, and move; the loadstone draws iron; and the
parts of a candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give
us both light and heat. These and the like effects we see and know:
but the causes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we
can only guess and probably conjecture. For these and the like, coming
not within the scrutiny of human senses, cannot be examined by them,
or be attested by anybody; and therefore can appear more or less
probable, only as they more or less agree to truths that are
established in our minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts
of our knowledge and observation. Analogy in these matters is the only
help we have, and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of
probability. Thus, observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies
violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire itself,
we have reason to think, that what we call heat and fire consists in a
violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning
matter. Observing likewise that the different refractions of
pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the different appearances of
several colours; and also, that the different ranging and laying the
superficial parts of several bodies, as of velvet, watered silk,
&c., does the like, we think it probable that the colour and shining
of bodies is in them nothing but the different arrangement and
refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus, finding in
all parts of the creation, that fall under human observation, that
there is a gradual connexion of one with another, without any great or
discernible gaps between, in all that great variety of things we see
in the world, which are so closely linked together, that, in the
several ranks of beings, it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt
them; we have reason to be persuaded that, by such gentle steps,
things ascend upwards in degrees of perfection. It is a hard matter to
say where sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and
irrational end: and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine
precisely which is the lowest species of living things, and which
the first of those which have no life? Things, as far as we can
observe, lessen and augment, as the quantity does in a regular cone;
where, though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the
diameter at a remote distance, yet the difference between the upper
and under, where they touch one another, is hardly discernible. The
difference is exceeding great between some men and some animals: but
if we will compare the understanding and abilities of some men and
some brutes, we shall find so little difference, that it will be
hard to say, that that of the man is either clearer or larger.
Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards in
those parts of the creation that are beneath man, the rule of
analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in things above us
and our observation; and that there are several ranks of intelligent
beings, excelling us in several degrees of perfection, ascending
upwards towards the infinite perfection of the Creator, by gentle
steps and differences, that are every one at no great distance from
the next to it. This sort of probability, which is the best conduct of
rational experiments, and the rise of hypothesis, has also its use and
influence; and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the
discovery of truths and useful productions, which would otherwise
lie concealed.
13. One case where contrary experience lessens not the testimony.
Though the common experience and the ordinary course of things have
justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or
refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief; yet there is one
case, wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to
a fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are
suitable to ends aimed at by Him who has the power to change the
course of nature, there, under such circumstances, that may be the
fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or
contrary to ordinary observation. This is the proper case of miracles,
which, well attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give
it also to other truths, which need such confirmation.
14. The bare testimony of divine revelation is the highest
certainty. Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort
of propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent,
upon bare testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with
common experience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. The
reason whereof is, because the testimony is of such an one as cannot
deceive nor be deceived: and that is of God himself. This carries with
it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is
called by a peculiar name, revelation, and our assent to it, faith,
which as absolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes
all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our
own being, as we can whether any revelation from God be true. So
that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance,
and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must
be sure that it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it
right: else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of
enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith
and assurance in what is not divine revelation. And therefore, in
those cases, our assent can be rationally no higher than the
evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of
the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a
revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable
proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or
diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of
the proofs. But of faith, and the precedency it ought to have before
other arguments of persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter; where I
treat of it as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to
reason; though in truth it be nothing else but an assent founded on
the highest reason.
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