Find Enlightenment | Contents | Previous Chapter |
Chapter XVIII
Of Faith and Reason, and their Distinct Provinces
1. Necessary to know their boundaries. It has been above shown, 1.
That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts,
where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational
knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and
certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4.
That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have
neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom
our reason upon.
From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the
measures and boundaries between faith and reason: the want whereof may
possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at
least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world. For till
it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by
faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another
in matters of religion.
2. Faith and reason, what, as contradistinguished. I find every
sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and
where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above
reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever
convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting
down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the
first point established in all questions where faith has anything to
do.
Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take
to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such
propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made
from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties;
viz. by sensation or reflection.
Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus
made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the
proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of
communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call
revelation.
3. No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation.
First, Then I say, that no man inspired by God can by any revelation
communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before
from sensation or reflection. For, whatsoever impressions he himself
may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be
of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or
any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us,
cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the
custom of using them for signs, that they excite and revive in our
minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before.
For words, seen or heard, recall to our thoughts those ideas only
which to us they have been wont to be signs of, but cannot introduce
any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in
all other signs; which cannot signify to us things of which we have
before never had any idea at all.
Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt
up into the third heaven; whatever new ideas his mind there
received, all the description he can make to others of that place,
is only this, That there are such things, "as eye hath not seen, nor
ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." And
supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a species of
creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it
is possible there may be such, nobody can deny,) which had six senses;
and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth
sense: he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men
those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey
the idea of any colour, by the sound of words, into a man who,
having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the
fifth, of seeing. For our simple ideas, then, which are the
foundation, and sole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we
must depend wholly on our reason; I mean our natural faculties; and
can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional
revelation. I say, traditional revelation, in distinction to
original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impression which is
made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set
any bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to
others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions
one to another.
4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions knowable
also by reason, but not with the same certainty that reason doth.
Secondly, I say that the same truths may be discovered, and conveyed
down from revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by
those ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation,
discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by
the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery
themselves. In all things of this kind there is little need or use
of revelation, God having furnished us with natural and surer means to
arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the
clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own
ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to
us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have that this
revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the
knowledge we have from the clear and distinct perception of the
agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: v.g. if it were revealed
some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two
right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon
the credit of that tradition, that it was revealed: but that would
never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it, upon
the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and
the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact
knowable by our senses; v.g. the history of the deluge is conveyed
to us by writings which had their original from revelation: and yet
nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of
the flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had
he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance
than that of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ
by Moses inspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses
wrote that book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the
assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance
of his senses.
5. Even original revelation cannot be admitted against the clear
evidence of reason. In propositions, then, whose certainty is built
upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our
ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident
propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations
we need not the assistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our
assent, and introduce them into our minds. Because the natural ways of
knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is
the greatest assurance we can possibly have of anything, unless
where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too our assurance
can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation
from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or
overrule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with any man to
admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence
of his own understanding. For, since no evidence of our faculties,
by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the
certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth
anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct
knowledge; v.g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly
agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement,
that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body
to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to
the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, first,
that we deceive not ourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly,
that we understand it right; can never be so great as the evidence
of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for
the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no
proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the
assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear
intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles
and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: and
there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no
measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful
propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we
certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In
propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the
agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to
urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent under
that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of
anything that contradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be
founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any
proposition to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its
being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the
whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God
revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed
revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this
objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that
to come from God, the bountiful Author of our being, which, if
received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of
knowledge he has given us; render all our faculties useless; wholly
destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our
understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less
light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind
of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of
anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its
own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of
its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose revelation has not
a greater evidence than those principles have.
6. Traditional revelation much less. Thus far a man has use of
reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original
revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself. But to all
those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay
obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the
tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them,
reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can
induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine
revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word, (called
commonly divine faith), has to do with no propositions, but those
which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how
those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith can say
that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that
such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is
of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed that that proposition, or
all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such
a revelation, the believing, or not believing, that proposition, or
book, to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but
matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by
the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to
believe that which is contrary to itself: it being impossible for
reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears
unreasonable.
In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our
ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned,
reason is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may, in
consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases
invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear
and evident sentience of reason, to quit it for the contrary
opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith: which can have
no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason.
7. Things above reason are, when revealed, the proper matter of
faith. But, Thirdly, There being many things wherein we have very
imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past,
present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties,
we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the
discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when
revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels
rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state: and
that the dead shall rise, and live again: these and the like, being
beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, with
which reason has directly nothing to do.
8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith;
and must carry it against probable conjectures of reason. But since
God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own
hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation
in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give
a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleased to
give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason.
Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not
evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in
it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is
satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But
yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a
revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is
delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation which is
contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident
knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there
reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province. Since
a man can never have so certain a knowledge that a proposition which
contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was
divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it
is delivered, as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound
to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it,
without examination, as a matter of faith.
9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably,
ought to be hearkened to. First, Whatever proposition is revealed,
of whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions,
cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above reason.
Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its
natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally
acquired ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still,
that, in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence,
and so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which
still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing
violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning
the principles of all reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an
evident revelation ought to determine our assent, even against
probability. For where the principles of reason have not evidenced a
proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation,
as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine; and
so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because
reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher
than probability, faith gave the determination where reason came
short; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay.
10. In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to
be hearkened to. Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that
without any violence or hindrance to reason; which is not injured or
disturbed, but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth,
coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath
revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be made of it. This is the
proper object of faith: but whether it be a divine revelation or no,
reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater
evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain
probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be
no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original,
in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so
clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason: and
therefore Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the
clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to he urged
or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to
do. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to overrule all our
opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received
with full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith,
takes not away the landmarks of knowledge: this shakes not the
foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for
which they were given us.
11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no
enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted. If the
provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these
boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for
reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that
are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve
to be blamed. For, to this crying up of faith in opposition to reason,
we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill
almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men
having been principled with an opinion that they must not consult
reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory
to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge, have
let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by
them led into so strange opinions, and extravagant practices in
religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their
follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great
and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and
offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which
should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to
elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men
often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts
themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is
impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal; but
would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or
religion by.
Next Chapter>