Department of Philosophy
Rockford College
5050 East State Street
Rockford, Illinois 61108
Abstract
FOUNDATIONALISM:
A DIRECT REALIST AND DEVELOPMENTAL
ACCOUNT
Stephen R.C. Hicks
I present a type of foundationalism that is new in two significant ways.
First, most foundationalists hold that because of perceptual relativity,
illusions, and the standard skeptical arguments, external world propositions
can be justified only indirectly by means of subjective states or propositions. Thus most foundationalists follow the
traditional representationalist pattern -- albeit in sophisticated forms -- of
attempting to argue their way to the external world. I argue that skepticism is wrong in principle and so can be set
aside at the outset; and I argue that perceptual illusions and relativity are
fully compatible with perceptual direct realism. This allows me to advance a nonrepresentationalist account of
justification based upon direct realism.
This also means that I explicitly link my theory of justification to a
theory of perception, rather than attempting (as do virtually all current foundationalists)
to give a theory of justification while trying not to make any commitments to a
theory of perception.
Second, antifoundationalists have argued that foundationalism fails because
the perceptual given is either theory-laden, inferentially constructed, or
noncognitive. Antifoundationalists have
argued further that contextual dimensions of justification are incompatible
with hierarchical dimensions of justification. (Virtually all current foundationalists also accept the idea that
contextuality and hierarchy are at odds with each other.) I argue against each of these claims, and
present a developmental account of foundationalism that allows for revisions
while preserving the necessary hierarchical justificatory relationships
ultimately grounded in perceptual states.
To accomplish this, I reject traditional foundationalism's insistence
upon the incorrigibility of basic propositions. Then I argue that conceptual or logical revisions can force a
reconstruction or modification of a justificatory hierarchy without severing
that hierarchy's connection to perceptual states.
Thus, I defend a direct realist and developmental account of
foundationalism.
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