TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Preamble and Introduction
• 1. On Justifying Standards of Justification
  • 1.I. Justification Standards
  • 1.II. The Problem of Meta-Justification
  • 1.III. Track Record Arguments
  • 1.IV. What Epistemic Circularity Is
  • 1.V. Licensing Standards
  • 1.VI. How Justification Standards are Interrelated
  • 1.VII. The Meta-Regress Argument
• 2. Is Epistemic Circularity Vicious?
  • 2.I. What's Wrong with Self-Support Meta-Foundationalism?
  • 2.II. Alston's View as an Introduction
  • 2.III. Arguments for Benignity
  • 2.IV. The Argument from Philosophical Requirements
  • 2.V. The Equal Availability Argument
  • 2.VI. The Arbitrary Case Argument
  • 2.VII. The Supports Argument
  • 2.VIII. Conclusion
• 3. Other Attempted Solutions to the Problem of Meta-Justification
  • 3.I. Introduction: Coherentism and Meta-Coherentism
  • 3.II. Meta-Coherentism and Epistemic Circularity
  • 3.III. Can MRE Help to Mitigate the Viciousness of Epistemic Circularity?
  • 3.IV. Does the Size of the Circle Matter?
  • 3.V. Meta-Regressism
  • 3.VI. The Problem of the Criterion
  • 3.VII. Unlicensed Meta-Epistemology
  • 3.VIII. Strangely Justified Beliefs
  • 3.IX. Conclusion
• 4. A Reidian Meta-Epistemology
  • 4.I. Meta-Skepticism
  • 4.II. Toward a Theory of Minimal Epistemic Rationality
  • 4.III. Rationality and Properly Basic Doxastic Practices
  • 4.IV. Strawson's Dissolution of the Problem of Induction, and Salmon's Criticisms
  • 4.V. The Principle of Rationality
  • 4.VI. Nonjustified Beliefs
  • 4.VII. A Solution to the PMJ and a Refutation of Meta-Skepticism
  • 4.VIII. Conclusion
• Notes